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Introduction
This report introduces MAlSim – Mobile Agent Malware Simulator, a mobile agent
framework developed to address one of the most important problems related to the
simulation of attacks against critical infrastructures1 i.e. the lack of adequate tools
for the simulation of malicious software (malware). Malware attacks are the most
frequent in the Internet and they pose a serious threat against critical networked
infrastructures.
Our Action: Security of Critical Networked Infrastructures (SCNI) aims at fa-
cilitating the description, assessment and governance from the security point of
view of critical networked infrastructures, including information systems, commu-
nication networks, electricity and other energy networks and water networks. The
main interest is in cross-border and European-wide issues.
The action concentrates on the cybersecurity and topological aspects of in-
frastructures and their interdependencies, and studies their vulnerabilities (at the
technological and system levels), the potential malicious threats that might affect
them, the related detrimental attacks, and the countermeasures that can be put in
place for securing those systems. It also studies the conditions and potential means
for making decisions on security matters, estimating the impact of these decision,
and facilitating the interaction among the stakeholders.
The focus is on providing policy makers and the stakeholders of critical in-
frastructures with information and instruments for a better understanding of the
risks, for the qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the security issues, for the
determination of the security condition of systems. From the technological per-
spective, the action studies the security of industrial control systems (e.g. SCADA,
protection and defence systems, monitoring systems), of communication infrastruc-
tures (e.g. Internet protocols and WAN), and their application in concrete industrial
environments (e.g. electric power).
One of our studies concentrates on developing a systematic approach for the
identification and assessment of security risk threats to information systems. The
approach is based on the systematic planning, performance and description of ex-
periments with simulations of attacks affecting control and supervision systems.
We analyse the network of a critical infrastructure and on the basis of our observa-
1Critical Infrastructures are defined as organisations or facilities of key importance to public
interest whose failure or impairment could result in detrimental supply shortages, substantial dis-
turbance to public order or similar dramatic impact [10]. Today most of critical infrastructures
depend highly on the underlying communication networks.
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tions we reconstruct it in our laboratory. In this configuration we implement attack
scenarios. Then analyse results in order to evaluate impact of the attack, test ro-
bustness and identify countermeasures. The description, preparation, execution and
results of the experiments will constitute the information source for trust cases i.e.
documented bodies of evidence that provide demonstrable and valid arguments that
a critical infrastructure is adequately safe and secure.
However we have encountered the problem of lack of software and methodology
for simulation of malware – malicious software that run on a computer and make
the system behaving in a way wanted by an attacker [29].
Malware can be categorised into the following families [29]:
• Viruses – which are self-replicating programs able to attach themselves to
other programs (host files) such as executables, word processing documents
and require human interaction to propagate.
• Worms – self-replicating programs autonomously (without human interaction)
spreading across a network.
• Malicious mobile code – lightweight Javascript, VBScript, Java, or ActiveX
programs that are downloaded from a remote system and executed locally
with minimal or no user intervention.
• Backdoors – bypassing normal security controls to give an attacker access to
a computer system.
• Trojan horses – disguising themselves as useful programs while masking hidden
malicious purpose.
• User-level RootKits – replacing or modifying executable programs used by
system administrators and users.
• Kernel-level RootKits – manipulating the kernel of operating system to hide
and create backdoors.
• Combination malware – combining techniques of other malware families.
Malware based attacks are the most frequent in the Internet and they pose a
serious threat against critical networked infrastructures.
For answering this issue, we decided to develop a malware simulation tool with
our own forces. In this way Mobile Agent Malware Simulator (MAlSim) was created.
MAlSim is a software framework which aims at simulation of various malicious
software in computer network of an arbitrary information system.
The report is organised as follows: in Chapter 1 we present a brief overview of the
related works. In Chapter 2 we describe MAlSim and the simulation environment, in
which the framework is deployed. Finally, in Chapter 3 we present our conclusions.
Chapter 1
Related work
We haven’t been able to identify any compound frameworks for performing sim-
ulations of diverse types of malware. However there are documented studies on
simulation of particular malware families such as computer viruses and worms.
The studies on virus simulation tools span between:
• Educational simulators i.e. programs demonstrating the effects of virus infec-
tion [13]. This group of programs include Virus Simulation Suite written in
1990 by Joe Hirst, which is a collection of executables, that ‘simulate the
visual and aural effects of some of the PC viruses’ [15]. Another example is
Virlab [9] from 1993, which simulates the spread of DOS computer viruses,
and provides a course on virus prevention. (As it can be noticed, the programs
are quite out of date, and today they would rather serve just as a historical
reference.)
• Anti-virus testing simulators i.e. programs which are supposed to simulate
viral activity, in order to test anti-virus programs without having to use real,
potentially dangerous, viruses. Unfortunately, it seams that only one solution
of this type was developed [13], namely Rosenthal Virus Simulator [27]. The
simulator is a set of programs which provide ‘safe and sterile, controlled test
suites of sample virus programs’, developed for ‘evaluating anti-virus secu-
rity measures without harm or contamination of the system’ [27]. Again the
applicability of the suite is limited since it was written ten years ago.
Concerning the simulation of worms, the prevalent work was done on developing
mathematical models of worm propagation [8,28,30,36], which base on epidemiolog-
ical equations that describe spread of real-world diseases. The empirical approaches
concentrated mainly on single-node worm spread simulators [19, 20, 24, 32], which
are dedicated to run on one machine. Only few distributed worm simulations were
implemented [25, 33, 34] but they approach modelling of worm propagation in the
Internet and thus they don’t respond our need for simulation tool allowing experi-
ments in an arbitrary network of predefined topology.
Also Trojan Simulator [23] has limited applicability in our studies. It was de-
veloped for evaluating effectiveness of anti-trojan software, and as such fulfills its
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purpose. However from the point of view of our experiments, it lacks the behav-
ioural part, since the trojan malicious activities (e.g. stealthy task execution which
consumes processor time or sending packets over network) are not simulated.
Chapter 2
Simulation Environment
The simulations of malicious software are performed based on Mobile Agent Malware
Simulator framework deployed in the simulation environment reconstructing the
information system of an evaluated infrastructure (Mirrored Information System, see
Figure 2.1). Additionally the environment comprises auxiliary parts which support
configuration, performance and observation of the experiments; collection, storage
and processing of results; and storage and provision of countermeasures.
Figure 2.1: Simulation environment.
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2.1 MAlSim Framework
MAlSim – (Mobile Agent Malware Simulator) Framework is a software toolkit which
aims at simulation of various malicious software in computer network of an arbitrary
information system. The framework aims at reflecting the behaviours of various fam-
ilies of malware (worms, viruses, malicious mobile code etc.) and various species of
malware belonging to the same family (e.g. macro viruses, metamorphic and poly-
morphic viruses etc.). The simulated software can refer to well-known malware (e.g.
Code Red, Nimda, SQL Slammer) but also it can simulate generic behaviours (file
sharing propagation, e-mail propagation) and non-existent configurations (which
supports the experiments aiming at predicting the system behaviour in the face of
new malware).
MAlSim Framework was developed using the technology of mobile agents. Soft-
ware agents are software components, that are [2]:
• Autonomous – able to exercise control over their own actions.
• Proactive (or goal-oriented or purposeful) – goal oriented and able to ac-
complish goals without prompting from a user, and reacting to changes in an
environment.
• Social (or socially able or communicative) – able to communicate both with
humans and other agents.
Mobile agents are software agents able to roam network freely, to spontaneously
relocate themselves from one device to another.
Mobile Agent approach was chosen for the development of MAlSim because it
particularly fits this purpose. Agents have much in common with malicious programs.
Similarly to worms and viruses, they have the ability of relocating themselves from
one computer to another. They are also autonomous as the worms are. At the same
time they operate on agent platform which forms a type of sandbox facilitating their
control.
Agent platform is an execution environment for agents which supplies the agents
with various functionalities characteristic for the agent paradigm (such as agent
intercommunication, agent autonomy, yellow pages, mobility etc.).
Agent platforms are deployed horizontally over multiple hardware devices through
containers. On each device at least one container may be set up. Each container is an
instance of a virtual machine and it forms a virtual agent network node. Containers
make agent platform independent from underlying operating systems. Mobile agents
are able to migrate from one container to another. Consequently, when containers
are deployed on different devices, mobile agents can migrate between different de-
vices.
Agent platforms can be imagined as agent communities where agents are man-
aged and are given the means to interact (communicate and exchange services).
Many agent communities may coexist at the same time. Depending on the imple-
mentation of the platform, agents may be able to leave one community (platform)
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and join another1.
MAlSim is dedicated for the JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) agent
platform.
JADE is a fully Java based agent platform which complies with the FIPA2 spec-
ifications. It is provided by means of:
• Software framework which facilitates the implementation of multi-agent sys-
tems through a middleware which supports agent execution and offers various
additional features (such as a Yellow Pages service or support for agents’
mobility).
• Set of graphical tools that supports the debugging and deployment phases.
JADE is licensed under Lesser General Public License (LGPL), meaning that
users can unlimitedly use both binaries and code of the platform. During over seven
years of its development JADE has become very popular among the members of
agent community and now it is probably the most often used agent platform. JADE
is continuously developed, improved and maintained, not only by the developers from
the Telecom Italia Lab (Tilab), where it was originated, but also by contributing
JADE community members [4, 31].
Further details on the choice of JADE for our works can be found in [18].
Figure 2.2: MAlSim deployment.
As shown in Figure 2.2 JADE has to be deployed over all hosts participating
in the experiments with MAlSim. In our configuration these are the computers of
Mirrored Information System and of the Attack and Threat Simulator. Java-based
JADE is flexibly installable on various operating systems, and we deploy it on various
distributions of Linux (Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS) and Microsoft Windows.
MAlSim Toolkit provides:
• Multiple classes of MAlSim agent (extensions of JADE Agent class).
1Further information on software agents an interested reader can find in [5–7,11,12,14,17,22,
35].
2www.fipa.org
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• Various behavioural patterns implemented as agent behaviours3 (extensions
of Behaviour class).
• Diverse migration/replication patterns implemented as agent behaviours (ex-
tensions of Behaviour class).
The MAlSim agent class is the basic agent code which implements the standard
agent functionalities related to its management on the agent platform, its commu-
nication skills and the characteristics related to the nature of simulated malicious
software. This code will be propagated across the attacked machines.
To render it operative, the code must be extended with instances of the behav-
iour classes and the migration/replication patterns. Depending on the chosen be-
haviour(s) and the migration/replication patterns, the instances of the same agent
class will be created on the attacked host, or instances of another agent class from
the toolkit.
The behavioural patterns comprise actions performed by malicious software such
as scanning for vulnerabilities of operating system, sending and receiving packets,
verifying if certain conditions are met. To support the demonstrative aspect of
experiments we have also developed patterns with audio-visual effects. For example,
to facilitate the observation of malware diffusion in the network, a sound can be
played by the agent after it arrived to a new container. The patterns also include
operations such as disabling network adapter, enabling a local firewall to operate
in all-block mode or starting a highly processor time consuming task etc. Using
the patterns we can show the malicious effects of malware. For example that after
malware infection, it is no longer possible to connect to the host, or that the host’s
performance is affected etc.
Migration and replication patterns describe the ways in which MAlSim agent
migrates across the attacked hosts. The patterns implement malware propagation
models and the propagation schemas specific to a particular information system
mirrored in the laboratory, which allow for characteristics such as: which networks
of the system will be affected, in which order, at what relative time etc.
Currently our repository of agent classes and behaviours contains only basic
malware implementations for zero-day viruses and worms, and we are planning to
extend it in the foreseeable future.
As it was depicted in the introduction, malicious software migrate from one
computer to another using network connections or portable data storage. They infect
files (e.g., executables, word processing documents, etc.) or consist of lightweight
programs that are downloaded from a remote system and executed locally with
minimal or no user intervention (typically written in Javascript, VBScript, Java, or
ActiveX). MAlSim on the other hand uses the migration mechanisms embedded in
the agent platform.
In the default configuration (used for the MAlSim implementation) these mech-
anisms are realised over Java Remote Method Invocation protocol on port 1099.
This introduces a difference between the simulated conditions and the conditions
3In agents terminology the agent’s behaviour is a set of actions performed in order to achieve
the goal. It represents a task that an agent can perform [3].
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of simulation. Thus we are going to develop agent behaviours aiming at minimis-
ing this difference. One solution could be for example to not allow MAlSim agent
migrate until a transport channel used by the prototype malware was opened. As a
result, MAlSim agent, even if ‘physically’ moving through the connection on 1099
port, will behave as relocating through a HTTP or POP3 connection etc.
During MAlSim setup we take the following steps:
1. We withdraw the attack scenario from repository. An attack scenario is a
sequence of steps taken during attack.
2. According to the chosen scenario we select the appropriate MAlSim agent
from the database and configure it. If none of existing MAlSim agents fit the
attack scenario, we develop a new MAlSim agent.
3. We extend the agent with migration schema (through adding agent behaviours
from the repository).
4. We extend the agent with malicious behaviour.
Figure 2.3: MAlSim Framework takes advantage of JADE GUI for control and ob-
servation of experiments.
The experiment are controlled through the graphical interface of the JADE main
container installed on a PC of Attack and Threat Simulator. As shown in Figure
2.3 the graphical console allows also observation of the diffusion of the simulated
malware.
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2.2 Simulation Lab Environment
Malware propagation features depend heavily on the characteristics of the underlying
network [34]. In contrast to the alternative works on malware simulation which use
modelling approaches to reconstruct the underlying network, we build a real, physical
configuration based on hardware of our cybersecurity laboratory.
Since our studies are focused on the security of critical networked infrastructures
we reconstruct the situation occurring in an analysed critical infrastructure. For
example, for the infrastructure of a power plant we mirror the process network
(interconnecting diverse subsystems of the energy production process), the field
network (interconnecting controllers and field devices), the corporate network etc.
(see Figure 2.1).
However it must be noted that MAlSim Framework is not stiffly fixed to the
setting of our cybersecurity laboratory and can be easily installed in any simulation
environment.
Configuration, performance and observation of experiments, collection, storage
and processing of results and other functionalities supporting performance of exper-
iments are provided by the following sections of our simulation environment:
• Threat and Attack Simulator, which aims at providing conditions for recon-
structing attacks and threats that can jeopardize the analysed information
system.
• Observer Terminal, which allows monitoring the traffic of Mirrored Information
System in order to evaluate the effects caused by the simulated attacks on
the system.
• Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Repository, storing information about
system vulnerabilities and the relative countermeasures.
• Testbed Master Administrator, used to remotely manage both the network
and the experiments.
• Horizontal Services, which provides support services such as FTP server,
backup service etc. to other subsystems.
2.3 Threat and Attack Simulator
Threat and Attack Simulator is the part of simulation environment where the sim-
ulated attacks are configured and launched.
There is a great number of already identified and documented attacks and there
are also many attacks yet unknown to the computer security community. All of the
attacks have diverse characteristics and they are performed in different ways. Some
of them originate on one host, but usually they require a chain of hosts (to amplify
the strength of attack or to make the attacker untraceable etc.). The attacks re-
quire diverse attacker skills, from very basic (running an automated application) to
very advanced (extensional developing skills, deep knowledge of computer system
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vulnerabilities etc.). Furthermore to perform the attacks diverse types of applica-
tions and operating systems must be used. In general, attacks of different types
can strongly differ in hardware (including attacker network topology) and software
resources required to perform them.
Thus one of the primary characteristics of a system aiming at simulating attacks
is its flexibility and easiness of configuration. The crucial feature of Threat and At-
tack Simulator is its flexibility in managing virtual subnetworks and creating multi-
ple virtual network nodes. The network nodes, the hosts, are easily configurable and
provided with diverse resources. Particularly they are provided with various software
i.e. the operating systems (various Linux distributions, Microsoft Windows versions
etc.), and the specialised programs for developing attacker tools and for performing
the attacks.
Figure 2.4: An exemplary setting of Threat and Attack Simulator network.
The topology of emulated fragments of Internet networks, as well as hosts which
form a part of this topology, and their resources, change depending on needs. And
the needs are determined by each particular attack. The subsystem is reconfigured
depending on the simulated attack. The system topology is defined and designed
in reference to each particular attack which is to be performed in its boundaries.
An exemplary network topology of Threat and Attack Simulator with four VLAN
networks is presented in Figure 2.4.
2.4 Observer Terminal
The scope of the Observer system is to keep track of all the malicious or anomalous
events happening in Mirrored Information System during tests and experiments.
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The system is based on the Intrusion Detection Engine. The implemented ar-
chitecture is composed of the following elements:
• Sensors, which capture the network traffic, analyse it and identify the traffic
patterns which satisfy some predefined criteria.
• Observer Network, which delivers the packets selected by the sensors to a
central collector.
• Observer Database, collecting data received by different sensors distributed in
the whole system, and providing support for database querying.
• User Consoles, providing interfaces for access of data collected in the database.
Figure 2.5: Observer Sensor structure.
For the implementation of the sensors we have adopted the Snort Technology
[26]. The technology supports the sensor operation in four different modes:
• Sniffer mode – packets are captured and displayed directly on a console.
• Packet Logger mode – packets are logged to disk.
• Network Intrusion Detection System mode – the most complex and config-
urable setting, which supports analyses of network traffic based on matches
against a user-defined sets of rules.
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• Inline mode – packets are collected from iptables instead of libpcap al-
lowing control over packet flow.
In our system, the sensors are set to the Network Intrusion Detection System mode.
Figure 2.5 presents the structure of an observer sensor.
The sensors track anomalies in the network and send alerts triggered by the
discovery of such anomalies to the Observer Database. The alerts are first sent to the
Observer Database server called Real-Time Repository. Then, after the experiment
termination, they are automatically transferred to the second Observer Database
server, namely the Archive Repository. This configuration allows keeping separated
the data of past experiments and the data of the experiment in progress, which
facilitates the analysis phase. Moreover keeping the two databases separated allows
access to the data of past experiments without affecting performance of alerts
collection of the ongoing experiment.
Figure 2.6: The graphical web interface of Observer Database is implemented in
BASE.
The graphical web interface for the remote access to Observer Database is
implemented in BASE framework (see Figure 2.6). BASE [1] is a web interface to
perform analyses of intrusions detected by Snort. It provides authentication and
access-control mechanisms.
2.5 Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Repository
The aim of Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Repository is to provide a structured
knowledge base on vulnerabilities, threats, attacks of information systems and on
the possible countermeasures.
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Figure 2.7: Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Repository. The dashed line arrows
represent the data flows among the components of the system.
As it is shown in Figure 2.7 the system is composed of two sub-systems: the
Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Database and the Binaries Repository.
The Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Database stores the knowledge about
the existing and known vulnerabilities, threats, attacks and countermeasures. The
Binary Repository is devoted to store and catalogue the attack tools, such as packet
generators, trojan horses and root-kits, and other executable code to be used in
security experiments carried out in the simulation environment.
We categorize the following types of information stored in the Vulnerabilities
and Countermeasures Repository:
• Off-line documentation – documents of various type (text files, word proces-
sor documents, graphical files etc.) stored locally in the file-system of the
Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Database.
• On-line documentation – information about vulnerabilities, attacks and coun-
termeasures located in external web-repositories of the Internet. This infor-
mation is linked to the database by external references.
• Binary codes – binary codes of patches, attack tools and other executables
stored in the Binaries Repository.
Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Repository was implemented in the frame-
work of Industrial Security Risks Assessment Workbench (InSAW) [16, 21] which is
our proprietary system based on a two tier client/server database driven architecture.
Developed with Microsoft Visual Studio 2005 and Microsoft .Net Framework 2.0.
InSAW facilitates assessment of vulnerabilities, threats, attacks and risks through
a set of libraries and the graphical interface which allows creation of graphs and
charts.
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Figure 2.8: Architecture of Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures Repository.
The system is composed of the following modules (Figure 2.8):
• SQLServer-based Database Management System for management of internal
data repositories.
• Libraries, which store the proper Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures related
information classified into:
– Vulnerabilities – categorised by vulnerability type, severity etc.
– Components – the vulnerable system elements.
– Threats – categorised by target, type and severity.
– Attacks – in the form of attack trees organised by type.
– Countermeasures – possible measures to avoid instantiation of threats.
• Systems Repository – a collection of databases, one for each analysed system.
• Analysis Engines – analysis engines for the evaluation of different aspects
related to vulnerabilities, attacks, threats and countermeasures.
• Querying, Reporting and Chart Units – facilitating data retrieval and repre-
sentation (by means of reports, charts and tables).
• System Aided Modelling Unit, which provides the interface for modelling of
vulnerabilities, attacks, threats and complex systems.
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2.6 Testbed Master Administrator
The Testbed Master Administrator system brings in tools for remote control and
monitoring of the hosts participating in the experiments. It manages the operations
related to initiation and termination of experiments and allows real time observation
of each system’s behaviour when a simulation is launched.
Since the remotely controlled hosts are supplied with various operating systems
(Windows and Linux), we employ diverse remote management solutions. For Win-
dows we take advantage of UltraVNC and Windows Remote Desktop. For Linux, a
remote management system based on SSH was applied, and the Putty SSH client
was installed.
2.7 Horizontal Services
The Horizontal Services system is responsible for providing services that are needed
for the efficient management of the simulation environment. At the current stage
the two services have been implemented:
• Backup Service, for restoring initial simulation conditions before each experi-
ment and to prevent from loss of data in case of hardware failure or accidental
erasure. Backup Service is implemented using Symantec NetBackup software
package, providing high-performance backups and restores for a variety of
platforms, including Microsoft Windows and Unix-like operating systems.
• FTP Filesharing Service, supplying the simulation environment with a shared
storage area which can be easily accessed from machines running diverse oper-
ating systems. The service is set up on open source FileZilla FTP Server, which
supports FTP and FTP over SSL/TLS, with a secure encrypted connection
between client and server. FileZilla also provides on-the-fly data compression
significantly improving transfer rates.
2.8 Case Study: Simulation of Zero-Day Virus At-
tack
As mentioned in Section 2.2 we have applied the framework for the experiments
aiming at evaluation of the security of a power plant infrastructure.
In order to perform this evaluation we reconstructed the network setting of the
power plant i.e. we mirrored (Figure 2.1):
• The process network, which interconnects diverse subsystems of the energy
production process.
• The field network, which interconnects controllers and field devices.
• The corporate network (Intranet).
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• Wireless LAN network.
• Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).
We deployed the JADE framework over the hosts mirroring Power Context and
Process Network. On each of the hosts we installed a representative JADE container.
In this setting we have performed the simulation of a zero-day virus attack.
A zero-day (or zero-hour) attack is a computer threat that exposes undisclosed or
unpatched computer application vulnerabilities. Zero-day attacks take advantage
of computer security holes for which no solution is currently available. Zero-day
exploits are released before the vendor patch is released to the public. A zero-day
exploit is usually unknown to the public and to the product vendor.
We have developed the attack scenario and based on this scenario we have
performed all its steps.
The scenario of the attack is as follows:
A power plant operator working on a PC in Power Context network
browses the Internet and gets accidentally infected by a virus which has
been just launched in the recent hours. This is a new type of virus,
not just a slight modification of an existing one. For this reason and
because of the fact that the virus is so recent, it is yet unknown to the
antivirus community (zero-day virus). Its signature is not stored in any
of antivirus databases. The virus infects programs on the user’s PC and,
taking advantage of the fact that the traffic between the hosts in the
Power Context network is allowed, it infects also the remaining hosts of
the Power Context network. Later on the user, unconscious of the fact
that his/her PC is infected by the virus, opens the VPN connection to
a host in Process Control network. Now the virus has a free passageway
to the critical subnetwork of the power plant network. It moves through
it and starts infecting the computers in the Process Control network.
Simultaneously, the adverse effects of the virus begin to be apparent.
The computers become less effective, the applications raise errors and
stop functioning, and the network connections are lost.
The general aim of this attack is to infect as many computers in the Internet
as possible and to cause their malfunctioning. The attack is not particularly ori-
ented against the power plant system, however when reaching the network of the
power plant, the virus can reach the Process Control Network and Power Context
subsystems.
In the simulation, the MAlSim agent had been launched at main-container and
after that it was creating its copies gradually on the hosts in Power Context and pro-
gressively in Process Network, starting from SCADA Server. At all of the computers
it deactivated the network card making any network-related operation impossible.
The experiment showed:
• The impact of the attack on the operation of the critical infrastructure can be
very strong. In worst case the attack can result in the lost of synchronisation
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of the traffic between the SCADA servers and the Field actuators, which can
lead to misfunctioning of the power plant.
• It is very difficult to prevent from this attack since its strength is based on its
urgency and unexpectedness. Most of antimalware software, being signature
based, will be not prepared for detection of this attack, and will let the virus
spread over the networks.
• A possible solution for protection from this type of attacks it to use anomaly
detection based malware detection engines.
Chapter 3
Conclusions
In the report we have presented MAlSim – Mobile Agent Malware Simulator, devel-
oped to address our needs for simulation tools to be applied during the experiments
aiming at evaluation of security threats to critical networked infrastructures.
The framework is based on the technology of mobile agents, which appears to
be particularly suitable for this application due to numerous similarities between
agents and malicious programs (such as mobility, autonomy etc.) and because of
the features of agent platforms which facilitate performance of experiments.
The framework is deployed (through JADE agent platform) in the simulation
environment of our cybersecurity laboratory. The environment comprises Mirrored
Information System aiming at reconstructing the information system of an evaluated
critical networked infrastructure; and supporting sections which, among the others,
facilitate configuration, performance and observation of experiments and collection,
storage and processing of results.
MAlSim Toolkit provides multiple classes of MAlSim agent and diverse behav-
ioural and migration/replication patterns, to be used for implementation of various
malware. At its current state, the repository of agent classes and behaviours con-
tains just basic malware implementations for zero-day viruses and worms, which
we were applying during the recent studies on computer security of a power plant.
However, in the foreseeable future we are going to extend the repository, providing
agent classes and behaviours of other malicious programs.
We are also going to develop agent behaviours aiming at minimising the dif-
ference between the simulated conditions and the conditions of simulation, which
stems from the fact that MAlSim uses default JADE communication mechanisms
realised over Java Remote Method Invocation protocol. Moreover, in the close fu-
ture we are going to install the agent simulation platform in alternative cybersecurity
laboratory.
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